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1 Introduction1 
 
n the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant develops a rigorous formulation 
of aesthetic judgments, in which he makes a sharp distinction between 
judgments of taste and judgments of the agreeable (both of which are, I 
claim, types of aesthetic judgments) if only to dismiss judgments of the 
agreeable as worthy objects of study.  Kant is primarily concerned with 
judgments of taste, the main example of which is judging something to be 
beautiful (whether it be a work of art or a natural object).  He asserts that such 
judgments are subjective, universal, necessary, disinterested, and do not 
presuppose a purpose.  The other type of aesthetic judgment are judgments of 
the agreeable, “which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that 
one likes something or finds it pleasing.”2  These are judgments of what, in 
Kant’s words, please  “the senses in sensation” as opposed to pleasing our 
cognition in reflection.3 
Let me be clear from the outset by saying that judgments of the 
agreeable are not Kant’s primary concern.  Using the terminology of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, judgments of the agreeable properly belong to sensibility, 
while judgments of taste (and thus, of the beautiful) belong to the 
understanding and finally judgments of the good belong to reason.  Kant is 
first and foremost interested in the understanding and reason and thus in 
judgments of taste and of the good.  That said, to fully understand judgments 
of taste, judgments of the agreeable cannot be neglected.  As Nick Zangwill 
writes of judgments of the agreeable (which he calls judgments of “niceness 
and nastiness”), “by and large, the interpretation of what Kant says about 
beautiful things hinges on what he says about the agreeable, rather than the 
                                                 
1 Helpful comments were made to the conference version of this paper at the 
American Society for Aesthetics Eastern Division Meeting (April 2007).  Thanks both to Moris 
Stern’s formal comments and to the other participants for their help.  In addition, Noël Carroll, 
Carol Gould, Paul Guyer, and Kristin Gjesdal instrumentally aided in the writing of this paper.  
Thanks for all their help. 
2 H. Ginsborg, “Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2005). 
3 I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
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other way around.   So if we are interested in what Kant says about the 
beautiful, it is important to get him right on the agreeable.”4  In this paper I 
follow on this premise of Zangwill’s and take a closer look at judgments of the 
agreeable and how they compare with judgments of taste.  This examination 
leads me to argue that the rigid distinction between judgments of the agreeable 
and judgments of the beautiful is not tenable and that this makes it difficult to 
delimit the sphere of the beautiful.  Thus, my contribution will be to show how 
the lack of a rigid distinction between these types of judgments threatens to 
undermine a Kantian aesthetics since, if this distinction cannot be made, the 
realm of the beautiful cannot be delimited.   
In the next section of the paper I discuss how Kant distinguishes 
judgments of taste from judgments of the agreeable, highlighting the role a 
particular type of interest plays in this distinction.  I then explore the possibility 
that this type of interest does not perfectly distinguish these two categories of 
aesthetic judgment.  This suggests that a rigid theoretical distinction between 
these types of judgment is not possible.  In the third section of the paper I 
discuss how we often mistake judgments of the agreeable for judgments of 
taste (and vice versa) such that there is not a practical distinction between the 
two types of aesthetic judgments.  That is, in the paper I will show that there 
are both theoretical and practical impediments to systematically distinguishing 
judgments of the taste and judgments of the agreeable.  In section 4 I then 
offer a possible solution to this problem, namely, categorization.  I conclude in 
section 5 by noting that despite attempts at overcoming the mistakes we make 
through categorization, these mistakes—and Kant’s rigid distinction between 
judgments of the agreeable and judgments of taste—continue to pose a 
problem for Kantian aesthetics. 
 
2 Types of Aesthetic Judgment: the Agreeable and the 
Beautiful 
 
2.1 Comparison Cases 
 
  Kant introduces judgments of the agreeable in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment in the context of differentiating judgments of the beautiful from 
both judgments of the agreeable and judgments of the good.  That is, 
judgments of the agreeable and judgments of the good are provided as 
comparison cases to judgments of the beautiful.  To distinguish a judgment of 
taste, a person is supposed to be able to reflect upon her feeling of pleasure, 
while reviewing the characteristics of judgments of the beautiful (provided by 
Kant in the four movements of the “Analytic of the Beautiful”).  By asking 
herself questions about the nature of her pleasure, she can eliminate judgments 
of the agreeable and come to see that her judgment was a judgment of the 
beautiful.  However, in order for such an exercise in elimination to work, Kant 
                                                 
4 N. Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable,” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 53:2 (1995), 167-176.  
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must have thought that judgments of the agreeable and of the good were 
similar enough to judgments of taste to provide meaningful comparison cases, 
and yet completely distinct from them. 
The agreeable is similar to the beautiful in that it is aesthetic, by which 
Kant means, in part, that its “determining ground cannot be other  than 
subjective.  Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations 
can be objective . . . but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated . . ..”5  
Aesthetic judgments involve the senses and are essentially judgments for me, 
involving pleasure or displeasure.  We must be careful, however, not to confuse 
judgments of impure beauty with judgments of the agreeable.  Judgments of 
impure beauty involve a concept, but are reflective judgments that involve 
more than the pleasure of our “senses in sensation.”  The good, on the other 
hand, which I will not treat in this paper, is “what is esteemed, approved, i.e. 
that on which he sets an objective value.”6  Both judgments of the good and 
judgments of the agreeable are “combined with interest” (§3-4) whereas 
judgments of beauty are not combined with interest.  I will return to the notion 
of interest in more detail below. 
In the second moment of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” Kant 
discusses the universal validity of judgments of the beautiful, something that 
sets them apart from judgments of the agreeable.  For Kant, what makes 
judgments of taste peculiar is that they are both subjective and universally valid.  
Being subjective means that, like judgments of the agreeable, judgments of 
taste are essentially judgments for me. Being universally valid, when we speak 
of beauty we do not merely speak of our own opinions or feelings but demand 
that others see this beauty as well.  As Kant famously wrote, when a man 
“pronounces that something is beautiful, then he expects the very same 
satisfaction of others: he judges not merely for himself, but for everyone, and 
speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.”7  It is the combination of 
these two properties,8 subjectivity and universality, that makes judgments of 
taste unique.9 
                                                 
5 Kant, op cit. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 In addition, the judgment of taste is not based on a concept and this distinguishes it 
from judgments of the good.  As Kant writes, “[O]ne must be fully convinced that through the 
judgment of taste (on the beautiful) one ascribes the satisfaction in an object to everyone, yet 
without grounding it on a concept (for then I would be the good), and that this claim to 
universal validity belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare something to be 
beautiful that without thinking this it would never occur to anyone to use this expression, rather 
everything that pleases without a concept would be counted as agreeable, regarding which 
everyone can be of his own mind, and no one expects assent to his judgment of taste of anyone 
else, although this is always the case in judgments of taste about beauty.” Ibid., §8. 
9 Hannah Ginsborg argues that this combination of subjectivity and universality 
involved in judgments of taste implicates the idea of necessity (the fourth moment of the 
Analytic of the Beautiful, which I will not discuss in this paper) since “in taking my judgment of 
beauty to be universally valid, I take it, not that everyone who perceives the object will share my  
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Despite the subjectivity of judgments of taste, Kant argues that the universal 
validity of subjective judgments of taste is guaranteed by common sense.  He 
writes that common sense is the subjective principle “which determines what 
pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but 
yet with universal validity.”10  Our aesthetic judgments are subjective, yet 
because others share common sense we demand that others share our 
judgments of taste.  And indeed, this is how Kant’s famous deduction 
proceeds.  Our subjective aesthetic judgments are universally communicable 
because we possess the sensus communis.  As Douglas Burnham writes in his 
Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, “Commonness is built right in to the 
very notion of aesthetic judgment.”11  However, it is “not in the everyday sense 
of a minimal level of understanding of things. It is, literally, the only dimension 
of sensing (rather than understanding) that is shared by everyone.”12  As Kant 
writes, “by the sensus communis one . . . understands the idea of a public sense, 
that is, a faculty of estimation which in its reflection takes account (a priori) of 
the mode of representation of everyone else, in order as it were, to weigh its 
judgment against the collective reason of mankind and thereby escape the 
illusion which arises from subjective private conditions that may easily be taken 
to be objective, [and] that would have a disadvantageous influence on the 
judgment.”13  To demand that another shares our judgments of taste requires 
that these judgments be communicable.  The sensus communis is what enables 
individuals to communicate their judgments of taste.  We can argue about 
them, defend them, convince others of their validity, etc. in a way that we 
cannot concerning judgments of the agreeable. 
Judgments of the agreeable, on the other hand, are also subjective, but 
not universally valid.  If I say “I like the ocean because it is blue,” and blue is 
my favorite color, I am not undergoing an experience of the beautiful, but 
merely feeling something agreeable.  In judgments of the agreeable we find the 
object in question pleasurable; whereas judgments of taste are based instead on 
the subjective feeling of pleasure we have when our cognitive faculties of 
imagination and understanding have been brought into harmony.   
Unlike judgments of taste, judgments of the agreeable are not 
universally valid, but are instead only generally valid.  That is, they apply only to 
“most but not to all men.”14  However, this does not mean that every person 
might not, as a matter of fact, share the same judgments concerning the 
agreeable.  As Kant wrote, “Nevertheless, one finds with regard to the 
agreeable that unanimity in their judging of it may be encountered among 
people, in view of which taste is denied of some of them but conceded to 
                                                                                                                  
pleasure in it and (relatedly) agree with my judgment, but that everyone ought to do so.” 
Ginsborg, op cit.  
10 Kant, op cit., §20.  
11 D. Burnham, An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000). 
12 T. Gracyk, Hume and Kant: Summary and Comparison (2004). 
13 Kant, op cit. 
14 N. Zangwill, “Aesthetic Judgment,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2003).  
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other.15“  The primary consequence is that individuals do not regularly expect 
others to make the same judgments of the agreeable as they do.  Thus, 
judgments of the agreeable say more about ourselves than they do about the 
aesthetic objects we are ostensibly judging.  Zangwill continues summing up 
the difference between judgments of taste and judgments of the agreeable by 
writing, “If I get pleasure from drinking Canary-wine, and you don’t, neither of 
us will think of the other as being mistaken. But if you don’t get pleasure from 
Shakespeare’s  Sonnets, I will think of you as being in error—not just your 
judgment, but your liking. I think that I am right to have my response, and that your 
response is defective.16“ 
 
2.2 Interest 
  
The primary axis on which I am going to compare judgments of the 
agreeable and judgments of taste is not universal validity but interest.  In §2 
Kant defines an interest by writing that it is “the satisfaction we combine with 
representation of the existence of an object,”17 and in §3 he writes that the 
pleasure derived “in the agreeable is combined with interest.”18  Nick Zangwill’s 
article “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable,” addresses the question of 
interested and disinterested pleasure.  He writes, by way of definition that, if  
“pleasure is an ‘interest,’ in Kant’s sense, it means that it bears an intimate 
relation to a desire (that is, a concern with real existence).  An ‘interest’ is a 
pleasure that has some kind of necessary connection with a desire.  A pleasure 
is ‘disinterested’ if it has no such necessary connection with desire . . ..”19  As 
Kant wrote, “One can say that among all these three kinds of satisfaction only 
that of taste for the beautiful is a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no 
interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts approval.”20 
There are two basic types of interest which are aesthetically important: 
the first is when the subject has an interest in a piece of fine art that goes 
beyond its aesthetic properties.  This type of interest includes situations in 
which a person likes a painting because it is, for example, (a) historically 
interesting, (b) ethically appealing, or (c) in fashion.21  In this case, the viewer 
could not have an aesthetic interest in the work at all (and thus, could not make 
even a judgment of the agreeable about the work).  This type of interest divides 
aesthetic judgment from non-aesthetic judgment (and thus, both judgments of 
taste and judgments of the agreeable can be said to be disinterested in this 
way).  In these cases of interestedness there would be no free play of the 
faculties of understanding and imagination since the work in question would be 
                                                 
15 Kant, op cit. 
16 Zangwill, “Aesthetic Judgment.” 
17 Kant, op cit. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable.” 
20 Kant, op cit. 
21 It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive list, but merely a laundry list of 
reasons.  
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placed under a concept before the understanding and the imagination are able 
to come into harmony in the judgment of the beautiful. 
There is a second type of interest, however, that separates judgments 
of the agreeable from judgments of taste.  This type of interest exists when the 
subject desires the work in question because of aesthetic properties that only 
affect his senses.  This is how we feel in the face of an agreeable work.   
Another way of putting this (as Kant does in §2) would be to say that this type 
of interest refers to the fact that the object we are judging actually exists.  If we 
have an interest in that object actually existing then we are merely making a 
judgment of the agreeable.  If, on the other hand, it does not matter whether 
the object at hand exists or not then it is possible that the work could “satisfy 
our cognition”22 and we will have made a legitimate judgment of taste.  Kant’s 
claim is not that we shouldn’t want to own a Picasso or a postcard of it—for 
we do, in fact, obtain pleasure from it—but instead that our judgment of taste 
concerning the Picasso is independent of and logically prior to our enjoyment 
of owning the Picasso.  As Kant writes, “One only wants to know whether the 
mere representation of the object is accompanied with satisfaction in me, 
however indifferent I might be with regard to the existence of the object of this 
representation.”23  Thus, the question is not: how do we know whether it 
matters if a work exists or not?  After all, all actual works which we judge do 
exist.  The question is rather: how does the work’s existence affect our 
aesthetic judgment of the work? 
If a work merely satisfies a person’s senses then she necessarily has an 
interest in the work’s existence.  Since the subject desires the agreeable, viewing 
it can be said to be interested in this second sense.  The agreeable must exist; 
otherwise it would not be pleasurable and could not be desired.  This second 
type of interest is perhaps troubling for a Kantian aesthetics as it does not 
neatly divide judgments of the agreeable from judgments of taste.  There are 
two potential problems for Kant, here.  First, it could be the case that some 
judgments of the agreeable are disinterested.  Second, some judgments of taste 
might be interested.  I will discuss each of these possibilities in turn.  
 
2.2a What if Some Judgments of the Agreeable Are 
Disinterested?  The Case of Sated Pleasures 
 
In his article “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable,” Nick Zangwill 
outlines the possibility that some judgments of the agreeable are disinterested, 
which I will discuss here.  For the purposes of his paper, Zangwill divides 
interested pleasures into the primitively and productively interested pleasures, 
the latter of which he believes Kant equates with judgments of the agreeable.  
He defines ‘primitively interested’ pleasures as “those pleasures which are 
generated by a desire” and ‘productively interested’ pleasures “those pleasures 
                                                 
22 Burnham, op cit. 
23 Kant, op cit.  
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which generate desire.”24  He explains interested pleasures with a story of 
Canary wine: 
 
I conjecture that the story would be as follows in the case 
of the pleasure of Canary wine.  To begin with, I taste the 
wine.  The wine has a certain flavor—a secondary quality 
like the greenness of a meadow.   I get pleasure from 
tasting the flavor.   As a result, I judge that it is nice 
(agreeable).  So far so good, except that desire has not as 
yet made an appearance.   Desire appears as follows: I 
represent another glass of wine as having a similar flavor.  I 
conclude that it too would be nice.   I am then led to 
desire another glass of wine as a potential source of more 
pleasure.   The pleasure in sensation has an inevitable 
tendency to provoke desire, given the thought of similar 
sensations.   I shall call this the ‘representational’ 
interpretation of Kant’s view of the production of desire 
by pleasure in the agreeable.25 
 
Zangwill’s representational theory of interest explains interest with 
reference to the desire for similar objects — he desires another wine with a 
similar taste.  This is an interested pleasure. 
Zangwill’s representational view can be opposed to a more causal view 
of interest, which would entail a much more direct relationship between the 
object of desire and the desire.  The story of the causal theory would be much 
simpler: the chocolate bar sitting on the table causes u s  t o  d e s i r e  i t  s i m p l y  
because we know how it tastes when we put it in our mouths.  “An agreeable 
object pleases by means of a purely physiological effect on the senses, and no 
particular conception of the object is required for its production of this 
pleasure.”26  This causal story does not explain why we desire other chocolate 
bars, as Zangwill’s representational theory does, but we could expand the 
causal explanation to do so.  As Paul Guyer writes, “if the experience of 
pleasure in an agreeable object does depend on the senses alone, and is due to 
a causal relation between properties of an object and one’s own physiology, 
then one may come to believe in a lawlike connection between objects of that 
sort and the experience of pleasure—at least for oneself.”27  What Zangwill’s 
theory does, however, is to specify the mechanism of this “lawlike 
connection.”   
In his paper, Zangwill moves on to show how primitively interested 
non-intentional pleasures are normally interested.  He interprets Kant as saying 
that pleasures in the agreeable are productively interested.  This is where the 
question arises as to whether some pleasures of the agreeable might not, in 
                                                 
24 Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable.” 
25 Ibid. 
26 P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
27 Ibid.  
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fact, be interested.  Zangwill asks, “How plausible is Kant’s claim that all 
pleasures in the agreeable are productively interested because they provoke 
desire when something else is represented as similar in the pleasure-inducing 
respect?’”28  He thinks that in most cases it is plausible, but his counterexample 
of sated pleasures shows that it is possible for an agreeable pleasure not to be 
interested (at least for a moment): 
 
Take chocolate.  Chocolate, as is well known, is ‘more-
ish.’  One might fancy just one piece.  But we soon find 
ourselves beset by a desire to go for a second.  And then 
a third.  But this does not go on forever.  At some point, 
we have had enough..   Now, what about the last piece 
that we enjoy just before we have had enough?  Call this 
last pleasure ‘sated pleasure.’  Are ‘sated’ pleasures 
interested?  Surely a sated pleasure does not produce a 
desire for more in the way that Kant says.  So sated 
pleasures seem to be counterexamples to Kant’s thesis 
about the agreeable.  And anyway, Kant’s view seems 
problematic in that if he says that pleasure in the 
agreeable always produces desire, then how could 
someone fully supplied ever stop eating chocolates?’29 
 
Using the example of sated preferences, Zangwill has shown that some 
agreeable pleasures are not productively interested (at least at the moment of 
being sated).  It should be noted here, first, that this argument only applies to 
productive interest in non-intentional agreeable pleasure, and second, that 
there are strategies that one might employ for Kant to maintain that all 
judgments of the agreeable are interested.  Zangwill outlines such a possibility, 
“Kant might argue that having had the pleasure, one would be motivated to 
regain a similar pleasure if one were to become aware that one is once again in 
a similar unsated situation.  Despite one’s present apathy, one is disposed to 
steer oneself in the direction of more chocolate on suitable further 
occasions.”30 
This appears to be a sound response to Zangwill’s case of sated 
pleasures initially, but a counter example will show that it is at least possible 
that such an argument does not always hold.  What if one overeats and does 
not believe they will ever be able to get back to their unsated self?  The general 
thesis of psychologist Daniel Gilbert’s Stumbling on Happiness, is that people are 
not very good at making predictions about their future selves.  He presents the 
overeating example in his book: “I can recall a Thanksgiving (well, actually 
most Thanksgivings) when I ate so much that I realized only as I swallowed my 
last bite of pumpkin pie that my breathing had become shallow and labored 
                                                 
28 Zangwill, “Kant on Pleasure in the Agreeable.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
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because my lungs no longer had room to expand.  I staggered to the living 
room, fell flat on the couch, and, as I descended mercifully into a tryptophan 
coma, was heard to utter these words ‘I’ll never eat again’.”31  It seems that in 
this case at the moment Gilbert is lying on the couch, he would not be 
“disposed to steer” himself in the direction of more pumpkin pie “on suitable 
further occasions.”  Gilbert’s notes that empirical research supports this 
notion: “[r]esearch in laboratories and supermarkets has demonstrated that 
when people who have recently eaten try to decide what they will want to eat 
next week, they reliably underestimate the extent of their future appetites.”32  
To the extent Gilbert is correct that people are not able to forecast a change in 
their state—such as realizing that he will indeed be hungry again in the 
future—Kant’s strategy of responding to sated pleasures that Zangwill 
proposes would fail.  Thus, it certainly seems that in certain circumstances 
judgments of the agreeable will be disinterested, such as when the stuffed 
Gilbert on the couch notes that turkey tastes good. 
 
2.2b What if Some Judgments of the Beautiful Are Interested?  
The Case of Pride in Ownership 
 
  In the “Definition of the beautiful derived from the first moment” 
Kant writes that “Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of 
representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any 
interest.”33  As Henry Allison notes, according to Kant’s claim that judgments 
of the beautiful must be disinterested they “must be independent of any 
concern for the existence of the object of that liking.”34  That is, they must be 
disinterested in the second of the ways outlined in Section 2.2.  In this section 
of the paper I will show that sometimes judgments of the beautiful are actually 
interested in this way. 
It is possible to state that by definition, judgments of the beautiful are 
never interested and that if they are, they are not pure judgments of taste.  In 
§2 Kant seems to do this when he writes, “Everyone must concede that a 
judgment on beauty, in which the least interest mingles, is very partial and no 
pure judgment of taste.  One must not be in the least prejudiced in favor of the 
existence of the thing, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play 
the judge in matters of taste.”35  However, in this section of the paper I will 
assume that it is, in theory, possible for a judgment of the beautiful to be 
interested especially in the case of judgments of adherent (or impure) beauty 
(which I will more fully address when I outline a possible method for avoiding 
mistakes between judgments of the agreeable and judgments of the beautiful).  
For if it is not, in theory, possible for a judgment of taste to be interested 
                                                 
31 D. Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (New York: Knopf, 2006). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Kant, op cit. 
34 H. E. Allison,  Kant's Theory of Taste, A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
35 Kant, op cit.  
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(partially or otherwise) then it might turn out that there was never, and could 
not possibly be, a pure judgment of taste.  That is, I don’t think that it is false 
by definition that judgments of taste can never be interested; it is something 
that must be shown.  For, in this paper, I am also assuming the judgments of 
taste are judgments that people make on a fairly regular basis and as such, can 
be investigated. 
  Other scholars have also argued that it must be shown that judgments 
of taste can never be interested.  Henry Allison wrote that one of the questions 
that need to be answered with regard to the disinterested pleasure of the 
beautiful, is whether “a disinterested liking or pleasure is possible at all, 
particularly given Kant’s subsequent characterization of pleasure as the 
‘consciousness of a representation’s causality directed at the subject’s state so 
as to keep him in that state.’  Since any pleasure thus involves an endeavor to 
maintain itself, it might seem that it must likewise involve an interest in the 
continued existence of whatever is responsible for producing this state in the 
first place.”36  Or, as Paul Guyer writes, “In §3, Kant differentiates pleasure in a 
beautiful object from that in an agreeable one by claiming that the latter 
produces an interest in further experiences of the same sort, and implying that 
the former does not.  However, it appears to be a defining characteristic of any 
kind of pleasure that it produce an interest in its own continuation, and this 
makes the difference between the beautiful and the agreeable obscure 
indeed.”37  That is, in Zangwill’s language discussed above, Guyer is saying that 
it looks like some judgments of the beautiful are productively interested. 
  One thing is certainly true: we do often care deeply about the 
continued existence of the objects of our judgments of the beautiful.  This is 
easily seen in the fact that we, as a society or as individuals, do, in fact, spend a 
lot of time, energy, and money in order to preserve works which elicit a 
judgment of taste.  The key, however, is that for a judgment to be a judgment 
of taste, the aesthetic pleasure that the object (or the representation of it) 
brings is supposed to trump all other considerations, including whether it 
continues to exist or not.  As Guyer writes, “Our readiness to dismiss . . . other 
answers [for why something might be beautiful] to a request for aesthetic 
judgment, in other words, is supposed to show that we all acknowledge the 
difference between contemplation of a representation and approval of actual 
existence, and that the identity of aesthetic response with the first of these may 
serve as a starting point for an aesthetic theory.”38  That is, to proclaim that a 
judgment has been a judgment of taste as opposed to a judgment of the 
agreeable we go through a process of elimination where we ask ourselves if we 
have an interest (of several kinds, whether it is morally superior, whether we 
are attached to it for sentimental reasons, whether we care about its continued 
existence, etc.) and if we find that we do not have such an interest then we can 
proclaim that we have had a judgment of the beautiful.   
                                                 
36 Allison, op cit. 
37 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste. 
38 Ibid.  
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  However, there are cases in which it is reasonable to believe that a 
judgment of taste is being undertaken but that it might be, at least partially, 
interested.  Paul Guyer notes two such circumstances.  First,  if “only one 
object can occasion a particular beautiful representation—if only the Mona Lisa 
originally painted by Leonardo can give us an adequate representation of the 
Mona Lisa—then it is completely natural that the pleasure we derive from the 
representation of that object should lead us to desire its continued existence.”39  
It is reasonable to assume that in all such cases of uniqueness, the pleasure we 
feel will be intimately related to the continued existence of the object.  And yet, 
we still would want to call the judgment about such an object a judgment of 
taste.  On the other side of the spectrum, “a genuine delight in the beautiful 
need [not] be able to survive any amount of repetition or imitation . . . the 
effect of repetition on aesthetic response may be the same as that of rule-
governedness, namely destruction of the at least apparent contingency of 
synthesis on which pleasure in the beautiful rests.”40  Even if the a person’s 
judgment of the Mona Lisa changes in the face of the onslaught of Mona Lisa 
postcards, we can still call this person’s original judgment a judgment of taste 
because the existence of the original Mona Lisa has been altered.  Thus, there 
are at least two cases in which a judgment of taste can be, at least partially, 
interested in the continued existence of its object. 
As I have shown in the preceding sections, it is possible that in some 
cases judgments of the agreeable might be (at least productively) disinterested 
and judgments of taste might be interested.  This signals the possibility, which I 
will discuss below, that individuals may sometimes mistake judgments of the 
agreeable for judgments of the beautiful (and vice versa).  This practical 
confusion, coupled with the theoretical inability to distinguish judgments of 
taste for judgments of the agreeable, both go to show that the judgments of the 
agreeable and judgments of taste are not analytically distinct.  However, I am 
not saying that there is a causal connection (in either direction) between (a) the 
fact that some judgments of the agreeable might be distinterested (and that 
some judgments of the beautiful might be interested) and (b) the fact that we 
sometimes mistake judgments of the agreeable for judgments of taste (and vice 
versa).  Both of these are examples of ways in which judgments of the 
agreeable and judgments of taste might not be conceptually distinct, a 
possibility that undermines a Kantian aesthetics. 
 
3 Mistakes We Make 
Thus far, I have outlined the key differences between judgments of 
taste and judgments of the agreeable and have shown some theoretical ways in 
which the rigid distinction between them is not tenable.  Now I want to move 
on to show some practical ways in which this distinction may not be as rigid as 
Kant supposes.  That is, we do, in fact, mistake judgments of the beautiful for 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
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judgments of the agreeable and vice versa.  When I say that we make mistakes I 
am saying that if we assume that a rigid categorization between the agreeable 
and the beautiful exists we will often make mistakes between these categories 
since differentiation is not always clear.  Of course, Kant foresaw the 
possibility that we would make errors regarding judgments of taste.  As he 
wrote in the footnote to §38, “If an error is made . . . that concerns only the 
incorrect application to a particular case of the authority that a law gives us, by 
which authority in general is not suspended.”41  H o w e v e r ,  i f  w e  r o u t i n e l y  
mistake one “category” for another (as I think we mistake judgments of the 
agreeable and judgments of the beautiful) it is an indication that these 
categories are not analytically distinct.  I thus discuss each type of mistake in 
turn.  Each of these mistakes has a proximal consequence and then a larger 
consequence which is more important for the Kantian aesthetic project and 
which I will discuss in the conclusion. 
 
Two Types of Mistake  
 
3.1 Mistaking Judgments of Taste for Judgments of the 
Agreeable 
 
Sometimes we mistake judgments of taste for judgments of the 
agreeable (examples of which I will turn to in a moment).  There are many 
reasons for making such mistakes.  These include, but are not limited to (a) the 
psychological (when we are not sure of our own position); (b) the philosophical 
(when we cannot philosophically justify the judgment); (c) the sociological 
(when the aesthetic community to which we belong does not conceive of a 
particular judgment of taste to be universally valid or does not hold the 
distinction between judgments of taste and of the agreeable); or (d) the 
educational (when our educational level is not high enough for us to conceive 
of universally valid statements).42   
An example of mistaking a judgment of taste for a judgment of the 
agreeable would be the following:  You visit the Museum of Modern Art with a 
close friend.  You’re in the large room with Monet’s Waterlilies.  You say to her 
“That is such a beautiful painting.  The rhythm of the shapes, the composition 
of the forms, the quality of the brushstrokes are so masterful.  And the 
painting as a whole captures us in the moment of perception; that really is what 
it’s like to see the light on waterlilies.  They truly are beautiful, don’t you 
think?”   
Your friend brashly responds, “This is kind of embarrassing, but I 
actually don’t find them beautiful.  And not only that, but I don’t think they are 
beautiful.  They’re fuzzy and sentimental and generally overrated.  The fact that 
you find them beautiful is great and all, but it’s just an example of your own 
                                                 
41 Kant, op cit. 
42 It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive list, but merely a laundry list of 
reasons.  
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personal taste.  Someone else could say that the Waterlilies really aren’t beautiful 
and they would be correct as well because that would be their own subjective 
taste.”  Here, your friend has made a mistake in her judgment.  She somehow 
has not responded to the work with the appropriate reaction of pleasurable, 
subjective reflection.  It should be noted that judgments concerning fine art are 
judgments of impure or adherent beauty, but this does not mean that they are 
not legitimate judgments of the beautiful.  The question is not whether the 
work is beautiful or not but whether the judgment has been a judgment of the 
beautiful.  Even though no proof for the judgment of the beautiful can be 
offered, you have made such a demand of your friend.  When her faculties 
were not brought into harmony and she failed to have such a judgment, she 
made a mistake thinking a judgment of the beautiful was a judgment of the 
agreeable.  Perhaps your friend’s judgment was connected with interest 
(perhaps she had just seen the painting etched on too many coffee cups) and 
thus could not have been a judgment of taste.  But in the context observed 
here, when your friend failed to have a judgment of taste she made a mistake in 
judgment.  That is, if we are observing strict boundaries between judgments of 
the agreeable and judgments of taste, then your friend has made a mistake. 
The proximal consequence of such a mistake would be the belief that 
even in judgments of the beautiful “each to their own taste” would apply or 
believing that it is true that “everyone has different tastes,” or as one Russian 
proverb puts it, “in taste and color there are no friends.”  In terms of aesthetic 
judgments, it is the belief that all aesthetic judgments of the beautiful are 
equally valid; that judgments of taste are not universally, but only personally, 
valid.   
 
3.2 Mistaking Judgments of Taste for Judgments of the 
Agreeable 
 
The opposite mistake also occurs; that is, we often mistake judgments 
of the agreeable for judgments of beauty.  An example of this would be would 
be: After eating a lavish seven-course dinner that a famous chef has cooked for 
you personally, you compliment him by saying, “That meal made me feel so 
good.  It was a truly beautiful meal in every sense of the word.  I say this in all 
honesty: if anyone did not find your seared foie gras perfectly sensuous, an 
example of a food that is beautiful, she would be wrong, dead wrong.   
Everyone should find your dishes among the beautiful.”43 
                                                 
43 There are other examples of this mistake.  For instance, my wife loves real maple 
syrup.  She hates fake maple syrup.  She thinks that anyone who likes fake maple syrup better 
than real maple syrup (and there are those who have this preference) are wrong, dead wrong.  
She is incredulous that anyone would have this preference because she thinks that her preference 
for real maple syrup, her belief that it is more “beautiful” than fake maple syrup is universally 
valid.  (Admittedly, she would not use the word beautiful in this context, but I think she is 
making, or thinks she is making, a judgment of taste). 
Whereas an example of mistaking a nonaesthetic judgment for a judgment of taste 
would be the following: After seeing the rather trite movie, “The Prince and Me,” your viewing 
companion says, “The Prince and Me was the most beautiful movie I’ve ever seen.  It really  
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Again your friend has made a mistake in her judgment.  In this 
example, she has a mistaken judgment of the beautiful when the object in 
question (food) is not capable of causing a free play of the understanding and 
the imagination.  The question here, again, is not whether the dinner is great or 
not, but whether the judgment has been a judgment of the beautiful or the 
agreeable.  In the framework of a Kantian aesthetics, an aesthetic object such 
as a dinner can only be a judgment of the agreeable.  This is true since food can 
only, says the Kantian, “please the senses in sensation” and cannot help but 
produce an interest in that kind of food’s continued existence.  That is, food is 
not a species of impure beauty, but is instead a species of the agreeable since it 
does not cause the free play of the faculties.  Since no proof of a judgment of 
taste can be offered, it might seem that mistaking a judgment of the agreeable 
for a judgment of the beautiful would not be a mistake but a case in one 
person’s faculties were in pleasurable free play (and so issued a judgment of the 
beautiful) and another person’s senses were merely pleased in the sensing.  In 
the case of the lavish dinner, however, this is a mistake because a lavish dinner 
is not the type of object that could cause the free play of the faculties (at least, 
if we are taking the agreeable and the beautiful as rigidly distinguishable).   
Perhaps what this means is that only when we are sated (at least with 
something that would normally produce a judgment of the agreeable) can such 
an object produce a judgment of the beautiful.  But in the context observed 
here, when your friend failed to have a judgment of the agreeable, she made a 
mistake in judgment.  That is, if we are observing strict boundaries between 
judgments of the agreeable and judgments of taste then your friend has made a 
mistake. 
One hypothesis for why this error occurs is that people have a 
tendency to believe that all of their aesthetic judgments have universal validity.  
Due to this natural inclination, we are often unable to differentiate our own 
judgments of taste and of the agreeable.  This is a point that Hume stressed 
when he wrote, “It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule by which 
the various sentiments of men may be reconciled . . . at least a decision 
afforded by confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.”44  P a u l  
Guyer remarks that this naturalness “might be taken to express [Hume’s] view 
that there is no justification or even explanation of our pursuit of agreement in 
subjective preferences, that this pursuit is just one of those points at which the 
explanations that can be offered by a Newtonian physics must come to an 
end.”45  Is making the mistakes discussed above simply the cost of making 
judgments about aesthetic objects?  Perhaps the nature of our senses makes 
                                                                                                                  
shows how far women have come and how the metaphysics of feminism has entered into our 
discourse.  If anybody doesn’t just think this is the most beautiful movie they’re a sexist and have 
no taste in movies.”  Your friend was interested in the movie for its political significance and 
thus could not be making an aesthetic judgment. 
44 D. Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in Essays: Moral,  Political, and Literary, trans. 
by E. F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985). 
45 P. Guyer, Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
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these mistakes inevitable.  When we view art, we first sense the aesthetic object 
and only after does our cognition grasp it.  Perhaps an individual cannot 
properly distinguish between activities of the mind and activities of the senses.  
If so, there is no practical or analytically rigorous way to differentiate between 
judgments of the agreeable and judgments of taste. 
 
4 A Concluding Strategy: Categorization 
 
Theoretically we have seen that it is not possible to fully separate 
judgments of taste from judgments of the agreeable according to interest.  It is 
also the case that humans have a tendency to mistake the two categories.  If the 
nature of our senses makes it impossible to always distinguish judgments of 
taste from those of the agreeable, it seems that such a distinction between these 
two categories may be untenable.  There is, however, one possible way in 
which such mistakes might be able to be overcome — categorization.  I will 
discuss this possibility here. 
Throughout this essay I have not been distinguishing between types of 
beauty so that my argument would be clearer.  However, in order to 
understand the strategy I propose for avoiding making the mistakes I have 
outlined above it is necessary to make this distinction now.  Kant distinguished 
between two types of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and adherent beauty 
(pulchritude adhaerens).  “The first presupposes no concept of what the object 
ought to be; the second does presuppose a concept and the perfection of the 
object in accordance with it.  The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of 
this or that thing; the later, as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), are 
ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end.”46  
Invoking this distinction can lead to a possible method for avoiding the 
mistakes I have outlined thus far. 
Each type of beauty suggests a type of judgment.  Free judgments of 
taste are reflective judgments because they involve the free play of the 
imagination and the understanding in a way that does not employ concepts.  
Adherent judgments of beauty, on the other hand, can be thought of as 
involving the judgment of something as being beautiful of a kind.  In fact, most 
art that we see (and which is beautiful) is of the adherent variety.47  T o  
conceptualize the adherence relation, Paul Guyer writes (referring to a view he 
once held) that “In the case of adherent beauty, the concept of the object that 
is presupposed by the judgment constrains or restricts what forms we can find 
                                                 
46 Kant, op cit. 
47 Some have noted the possibility that free beauty isn’t a relevant category when 
discussing fine art.  As Hannah Ginsborg notes, “The distinction is important because Kant 
suggests that all judgments of beauty about representational art are judgments of adherent rather 
than of free beauty, and hence that they are all impure. While some art works can be ‘free 
beauties,’ the examples Kant gives are all of non-representational art: ‘designs a la grecque, 
foliage for borders or on wallpaper…fantasias in music,’ and indeed, Kant adds, all music 
without a text (§16). It might be supposed from this that Kant’s core account of judgments of 
beauty is only peripherally applicable to art, which would make it largely irrelevant to the 
concerns of contemporary aesthetics.” Ginsborg, op cit.  
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beautiful in an object of a certain sort by considerations deriving from its 
intended function, but such constraints are not sufficient to determine what 
forms we will find beautiful in such an object.”48  When we see a work of art 
we see it as a member of a particular class or genre.  That is, when we view a 
painting, it is a portrait, or a cubist painting, or a historical allegory; it is never 
just a painting.  The category in which the painting is placed is a constraint on 
our aesthetic judgment making our aesthetic judgments adherent judgments.  
We condition our judgment on the extent to which the object fulfills its 
purpose as a member of the genre to which it belongs. 
This conception of adherent beauty is related to Kendall Walton’s 
discussion in “Categories of Art,” where he argues that aesthetic properties 
(and thus, aesthetic judgments) are contingent upon the category within which 
the judged artwork belongs.  He further proposes that the placement of 
artworks within categories is based on nonaesthetic features (what he terms 
standard, variable, and contrastandard features) and can be done (at least in 
many circumstances) correctly or incorrectly.49  If the categories alter our 
aesthetic judgments then, as Sheila Lintott notes, what “we know and learn 
about a work’s nonaesthetic features does affect our aesthetic appreciation of 
an object, first by helping us classify an object and then by defining a range of 
reasonable expectations regarding the object.”50  Our aesthetic expectations of 
a work are shaped by its nonaesthetic features.  The concepts adhering in 
adherent beauty provide a constraint on our judgment of beauty.  If this is the 
case, the nonaesthetic might help us to get a handle on the issue of aesthetic 
judgments, which do not admit of proofs. 
Walton’s “categories” can be seen as the presupposed concepts of 
adherent beauty.  Using this strategy, the art critic could outline the ways the 
categories adhere to instances of adherent beauty.  The adherence relation 
employs concepts, and thus can admit proofs, making it less subjective than 
aesthetic judgments.  Further, there are objective points that one can make 
concerning this adherence relation making its specification a possible role for 
the critic.  For example, if you were to put Monet’s Waterlilies in a photorealist 
show you would be forced to say that Monet’s painting either (1) is not any 
good or (2) does not belong in the show.  Since, most of us are committed to 
the opposite of (1) it is safe to say that (2) is the more plausible explanation.  
That is, if you were to believe that the concept of photorealism adhered to 
Monet’s Waterlilies you would have done something wrong and a critic could 
tell you so. 
How can this help us to avoid the types of mistakes outlined in this 
paper?  It has already been noted that since beauty is not a property, it cannot 
                                                 
48 Guyer, Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics. 
49 In Walton’s words, “[I]t seems that, at least in certain cases, it is correct to perceive a 
work in certain categories, and incorrect to perceive it in certain others; that is, out judgments of it 
when we perceive it in the former are likely to be true, and those we make when perceiving it in 
the latter false.” K. Walton, “Categories of Art,” in Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), 339-367. 
50 S. Lintott, “Adjudicating the Debate Over Two Models of Nature Appreciation,” in 
Journal of Aesthetic Education, 38:3 (2004), 52-72.  
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be the category into which works will fall.  Similarly, the agreeable cannot be 
such a category.  However, certain categories normally elicit (or should elicit) 
judgments of taste or judgments of the agreeable.  We have already seen how 
this could be said of the categories Kant lists as being exemplars of agreeable 
art, which include “entertaining narrative, the art of starting the whole table in 
unrestrained and sprightly conversation, or with jest and laughter inducing a 
certain air of gaiety,” among others.  These aesthetic categories should (in most 
cases) elicit a judgment of the agreeable.  Similarly, what are often called the 
fine or beaux arts (opera, ballet, painting, poetry, sculpture, architecture, and 
classical music) should elicit a judgment of taste from viewers.  The fact that 
we think that the fine arts should elicit judgments of taste is one reason why 
the potential classification of an art-form as a fine art (related to food, for 
example) is such a contentious and messy business.51  And, of course, there are 
many borderline cases between those categories that should elicit a judgment 
of taste as those that should elicit a judgment of beauty (such as food, video 
games, and television).  It is here that a critic, classifying artworks into Walton’s 
categories, could aid viewers in ascertaining the appropriate type of judgment.  
In most circumstances, if we can correctly categorize a work we will be able to 
know whether a “perfect” (or good, etc.) work in that category should elicit a 
judgment of taste or a judgment of the agreeable. 
Consider again the example of Monet’s Waterlilies.  You could say to 
your acquaintance who did not like the Waterlilies any one of the following 
things (all of which would be in accordance with the strategy I am currently 
outlining): (1) “I think you’re looking at the painting as a bad example of a 
photorealism, when it is actually a good example of impressionism.  And 
impressionist paintings, when they’re as fine as Monet’s, are supposed to elicit 
the judgment that they are beautiful.” (2) “Painting is one of the beaux arts and 
as such it is meant to elicit your judgment that the work is beautiful and that 
everyone should think that it is beautiful.” Or finally, (3) “The category of 
museum quality paintings (of which the Waterlilies is one since it is hung in one 
of the world’s foremost museums) is supposed to engage our cognition and 
thus elicit a judgment that the work is beautiful, not merely agreeable.” 
These methods can only amount to arguments concerning the 
categories to which the works belong and not arguments concerning the 
aesthetic judgments elicited by works in question (since these judgments do not 
employ concepts).  In addition, in aesthetics sense perception and cognition are 
not analytically distinct.  As a result, we will still make mistakes, but using my 
proposed strategy we will potentially have an easier time noting both (1) when 
we make mistakes and (2) when others make mistakes.  We will then be able to 
argue on the basis of categorization, a task which employs concepts and thus 
proofs, what category a work should belong to and thus, whether a judgment 
                                                 
51 Stanley Cavell suggests that that “the familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic 
judgment, rather than showing up an irrationality, shows the kind of rationality it has.” S. Cavell, 
“Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” in Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: 
Scribner, 1969).  
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concerning the work probably should elicit a judgment of taste or a judgment 
of the agreeable. 
In aesthetics, the satisfaction of the senses and the satisfaction of the 
cognition cannot be successfully analytically distinguished.  As a result, we will 
on occasion mistake judgments of the agreeable for judgments of taste and vice 
versa.  Using categories as aids to our judgment, however, could help minimize 
these errors.  Arguments concerning the categories to which the works belong 
are easier to resolve as they are conditional on concepts.  Critics can engage in 
these debates, helping to define categories that viewers can use to help them 
(1) know when they are making mistakes, and (2) know when others are 
making mistakes.  We will then be able to argue on the basis of categorization, 
a task which employs concepts and thus proofs, whether a judgment 
concerning the work should most likely elicit a judgment of taste or a judgment 
of the agreeable.  However, categorization will not completely eliminate these 
mistakes from our aesthetic lives.  Therefore, these mistakes still threaten the 
framework of a Kantian aesthetics. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
  This paper has provided some initial arguments for why judgments of 
taste and judgments of the agreeable might not be analytically distinguishable.  
Further work will be required to definitively determine if this is indeed the case.  
But if this is so, it threatens the Kantian aesthetic project.  That is, if sense and 
taste are not distinguishable then it is unclear when the demand that we share 
in each others judgments of taste is justified.  This, in turn, threatens the entire 
foundation of aesthetics.  For if there is no realm in which judgments of taste 
are appropriate (and nothing we can turn to determine conclusively that they 
are appropriate) then defining (and upholding) a realm of aesthetics becomes 
increasingly difficult.  Kant writes of this possibility in §57: “If, by contrast, 
agreeableness were to be assumed as the determining ground of taste (on 
account of the singularity of the representation that is the basis of the 
judgment of taste), as it is be some, or the principle of perfection were to be 
assumed, as it is by others, and the judgment of taste were to be fixed 
accordingly, then from that there would arise an antinomy that could not be 
resolved at all except by showing that both of the opposed propositions are 
false: which would then prove that the concept on which each is based is self-
contradictory.”52  In the first clause Kant is outlining the mistake of taking 
judgments of taste for judgments of the agreeable and in the second clause he 
is doing the reverse.  He concludes that if either of these were to hold, the 
antinomy of taste could not be resolved and thus, aesthetics would not be left 
on very firm ground.  This, unfortunately, is the situation that we are left in 
given the mistakes that we make regarding judgments of the beautiful and 
judgments of the agreeable.  As these mistakes seem to likely be based in an 
                                                 
52 Kant, op cit.  
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inability of people to differentiate sense from taste, the mistakes are unlikely to 
be resolved. 
The tendency of humans to try to demand universality of judgments of 
the agreeable could be reinforced by our interactions with others.  We usually 
talk about art with others who are like us, or share our preferences.  Perhaps 
we surround ourselves with people who share our preferences because we want 
others to have the same aesthetics judgments as we do.  This might lead us, 
however, to make demands of universality in judgments of agreeable where 
such universality cannot be demanded.  This might signify that aesthetic 
subcultures are connected (and separated from other aesthetic subcultures) 
through judgments of the agreeable and also that we believe and want 
judgments of taste to connect us with the rest of humanity.  This is an area 
worthy of further research. 
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